1. I start with two important aspects of Geurts's paper that are not easy to reconcile: the notion that "it is entirely possible to engage in the game of sharing and acting on commitments without knowing one's commitments or others', and indeed without knowing what commitments are" (p. 15), on the one hand, and, Geurts's account of commitment as mutual commitment, on the other.
There is a theory-internal reason for Geurts to assume that a speaker may not be aware of her commitments: that assumption underlies Geurts's claim that his theory has a much better chance of explaining toddlers' gradual mastery of speech acts -the basic building blocks of communication -than theories based on the recognition of communicative intentions. Geurts voices his doubts that young children can engage in metarepresentations (like attributing intentions) before they are able to use speech acts effectively, and I think that is entirely right. He also very much doubts that appeals to innateness -children would be born with metarepresentational abilities -hold much promise either. Here, he is probably thinking of proposals like those made within Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 2012) . I believe the jury is still out on this last issue. What is certain, however, is that Geurts's proposal, if correct, does not require postulating a dedicated metacommunicative module. According to the brief sketch provided by Geurts, young children learn to understand speech acts through the "statistical regularities" (p. 28), between these acts and certain observable behaviours, that result from the "normative practice of sharing commitments" (ibid.). And this they can do, initially at least, without needing to be aware of their commitments or of what commitments are.
A potential problem, however, is that Geurts's characterisation of how commitment sharing works in mature cognitive agents 1 is quite demanding in terms of awareness, and, especially, mutual awareness. Geurts advances that commitment sharing is the norm: "If C a,b p, then ceteris paribus C b,a p." In other words, if a is committed to b to acting on p, then normally b is committed to a to acting on p. Now, commitment could perhaps be shared without both parties realising that it is shared. But that, says Geurts, cannot be the case. In order to qualify as a genuine commitment, there must be uptake of the speaker's commitment by the addressee: "a's commitment to act on p doesn't hold unless b commits herself to act on the proposition that a is thus committed" (p. 18). There must be acceptance by b of the commitment: "there is no commitment unless it is accepted by both [parties]" (p. 19). Clearly, then, for a commitment to hold, both parties must be aware of it and must have somehow ratified it. As a characterisation of the commitments that hold between mature cognitive agents, this may seem quite cogent. But it is also obvious that the assumption that a commitment, by default, is shared -combined with the requirement that a shared commitment, via acceptance, be a mutual commitment -entails that there cannot be a genuine commitment without some amount of conscious inference. This conflicts with Geurts's claim that "a can be committed to act on p without suspecting that he is thus committed, and indeed without even entertaining the possibility that p" (p. 4). This quote probably applies to toddlers' or young children's commitments -though Geurts does not say. If that is the case, the question arises how young children, armed only with their sensitivity to statistical regularities, can transition to the more sophisticated stage of commitment making.
A lot may depend on how sophisticated the more sophisticated stage is. Central is the question whether metarepresentations are required or not. They are not if mutual commitment does not entail mutual acceptance; i.e. if all that is required, when for example Albert promises to help Brenda, is for Brenda to accept Albert's commitment to help her, and for Albert to accept Brenda's commitment to act on [[Albert will help Brenda]]. Such acceptance is clearly a psychological state, but Geurts, I suppose, would hold that there is no (or at least need not be any) self-attribution of acceptance (e.g. Brenda thinks "Albert is committed to acting on p" but does not reflexively think "I realise/accept/am aware that Albert is committed to acting on p"), 2 nor any attribution of acceptance to the other party (e.g. Brenda thinks "Albert is committed to acting on p" but does not think "Albert realises/accepts/is aware that I am committed to acting on p"). I must admit that I am not entirely clear about this. Geurts insists that commitments between speakers are "in the open" (p. 19). Since most commitments (of mature agents) are mutual, doesn't their being open, as mutual commitments, also require that acceptance of the commitment -a necessary condition for mutuality -be in the open? Mutual acceptance would involve attributions such as Albert's "Brenda is aware that I'm committed to helping her" or Brenda's "Albert is aware that I'm committed to acting on [[Albert will help me]]". These attributions do not seem far-fetched. Which obviously is not the same as saying that they are required.
If mutual acceptance, with its attendant metarepresentations, is required, then the commitment-based view of communication does not do any better than the intention-based accounts at explaining children's early basic grasp of speech acts and their gradual development of adult-like communicative skills. But even if mutual acceptance is not essential, Geurts is not entirely off the hook. First, he cannot maintain that "mutual commitment is a social concept, not a psychological one" (p. 17). True, mutual commitment doesn't entail belief, but it entails acceptance, which is a psychological state. This makes mutual commitment a concept that is both social and psychological. Second, as part of his challenge to the validity of the traditional accounts of communication, Geurts rightly points out the flaw in the view that "[i]f understanding a promise is primarily a matter of comprehending the speaker's intentions, children must be able to attribute intentions before they can understand promises" (p. 2). However, on Geurts's own demanding conception -according to which (most) commitments involved in the performance of speech acts are mutual commitments -young children must also have a notion of commitment before they can be said to make and understand promises. But Geurts himself hints that they initially have no such notion and cannot therefore accept some other party's commitment. In other words, young children cannot genuinely be said to produce and grasp the speech acts that, based on their communicative behaviour, we wish to attribute to them. That is a flaw too.
2. There are other places where I see psychological states play a greater role than allowed by Geurts. One such place is in Geurts's otherwise very attractive commitment-based account of conversational implicatures. Consider a situation in which Alice, after witnessing Clyde's handling of her purse, says to Brian, Clyde took some of the money. Geurts offers a derivation, free of beliefs and intentions, of the quantity implicature that Clyde did not take all of the money. However, several steps in the derivation appeal to the notion of evidence. For instance, it is said that Alice "either has evidence that Clyde took all her money or she has evidence that he took only some of it" (p. 22f.). Pace Geurts, I maintain that this is psychological talk. In the situation as described by Geurts, Alice has evidence that p is equivalent to Alice has seen that p (in a different context with a different evidential source, it could also have been Alice has heard that p or Alice has inferred that p). Seeing, hearing, inferring are states or acts endowed with an intentional content (in the sense of Brentano's intentionality). Attributing an inference that p to someone is clearly an attribution of a psychological act (every bit as much as attributing a belief is an attribution of a psychological state). By the same token, by attributing acts/states of seeing or hearing that p to the speaker, I attribute psychological acts/states to her. These attributions are metarepresentational. I conclude that Geurts's commitment-based reformulation of Grice's rational reconstructions does not actually succeed in avoiding recourse to psychological, including mentalistic, notions.
3. Geurts reinterprets expressives as expressing commitments. For instance, "thanking commits the speaker to being grateful, apologising commits her to being regretful, and so on" (p. 13f.). There are two problems that I see with this proposal. First, there is an imbalance between expressives, on the one hand, and constatives, commissives and directives on the other -what Geurts calls the major speech act types. The speaker commitment normally resulting from the former is a commitment to the psychological state associated to each expressive act by standard Speech-Act Theory, under the heading of the "sincerity condition". According to Geurts, my performance of an expressive speech act basically commits me to satisfying the sincerity condition that governs that act.
Geurts's proposal for the major speech acts is quite different, as it deliberately backgrounds the sincerity condition. Let me start with constative speech acts. The asserter of p is committed to acting on p, i.e. to acting "in ways that are consistent with the truth of […] p" (p. 8). This, arguably, is close to stating that the utterer believes that p. But, according to Geurts, an asserter's believing that p is only a conversational implicature deriving from the utterance of a constative. And even though conversational implicatures are themselves interpreted as commitments, they are somehow secondary commitments. This situation contrasts with that of expressives, where 'commitment to the relevant psychological state' is presented as the primary commitment undertaken by the utterer. What of commissives and directives? The psychological states that standard Speech-Act Theory associates with these speech acts are intention to bring p about and desire 4 that the addressee bring p about, respectively. Geurts's characterisation of the primary commitments resulting from the performance of these speech acts (quite rightly) makes no reference to these psychological states, stating simply that utterers who produce these speech acts are committed to acting on their propositional content. Again, however, satisfaction of the sincerity condition can be derived as a conversational implicature. I find Geurts's analysis of major speech acts quite compelling given what I understand to be his overall project: foregrounding the social factors underlying communication, instead of the customary focus on psychological aspects. But his treatment of expressives brings those psychological aspects back into the foreground, somehow weakening the general thrust of his proposal. Indeed, defenders of the traditional speech-act-theoretic accounts might ask why Geurts does not extend his treatment of expressives to the major speech act types as well. And that would be a legitimate question, never mind that I or others might not think it would be the right move to make.
3 Geurts does not speak of primary or secondary commitments. I none the less feel that the proposed distinction is not at odds with the spirit of Geurts's proposal. 4 Geurts discusses this in terms of intention rather than wanting or desiring. I think this is inaccurate.
The second problem I see is that it just does not seem true, for some expressives at least, that their performance results in a commitment to the relevant psychological state. Geurts mentions greetings as a type of expressive act. But what psychological state is the utterer of a greeting committed to? None, it seems. Note that that is also a problem for traditional Speech-Act Theory. After all, Searle himself (Searle 1969: 64, 65, 67) acknowledges that greetings are not subject to a sincerity condition. Nor do they have a propositional content (Searle 1969: 64) . Still, if greeting is a speech act, how can it be analysed in commitment terms? Geurts does not say. At the very least, his statement that "[e]very speech act causes the speaker to become committed to the hearer to act on a propositional content" cannot hold true. Maybe there is a commitment to something else, something of a social nature. That is something that remains for Geurts to tell us.
4. Geurts holds that the performance of any speech act, regardless of its type, results in a commitment of the speaker. That ensures a uniform treatment of all speech acts. At the same time, however, this uniform treatment may appear to have somewhat perplexing consequences in some cases. This is clearest with directives. On Geurts's proposal, if Alfred gives Bertha an order, then Alfred is committed to acting on the propositional content of the order. The same holds if Alfred makes a promise: he is thereby committed to acting on the propositional content of the promise. Now, that parallel treatment may strike some as counterintuitive. A pre-theoretical observer might want to frame things as follows: a directive is like the mirror-image of a commissive: whereas a commissive commits the speaker, a directive commits (well, attempts to commit) the addressee. I think there is quite a bit of merit to this unsophisticated hunch. Assuming that Alfred's order to Bertha is "Close the door", Geurts will say that Alfred commits himself to the truth of [[Bertha will close the door]]. Since commitments tend to be shared, it is quite likely that Bertha will become committed to acting on [[Bertha will close the door]] too. This gets Geurts the intended result. But note that that result is only obtained indirectly, via Alfred's commitment.
That apparent reversal of priorities is something that the pre-theoretical observer may find unpalatable. Interestingly, there are a few proposals in the literature that theorise a "speaker's call-on-addressee" or "commitment-shift", which captures something like the speaker's attempt to impose a commitment on the addressee (see Beyssade and Marandin 2009; Poschmann 2008) . Addressee-commitment is understood first and foremost as resulting from the use of particular phrases (e.g. please) or clause types (e.g. the imperative) or intonation patterns (e.g. a rising intonation), but it can also be determined inferentially. Whatever the details of these accounts, they are attractive, especially in the case of directive speech acts, because they put the commitment undertaken by the addressee at centre stage. It seems to me that Geurts's own account might benefit from a closer examination of these proposals and an assessment of the possibility of adopting some of their features.
5. The last point I will briefly touch upon has to do with directives again. Consider types of directives that are milder than orders, e.g. advice and recommendation. Consistency requires that Geurts say that the speaker who gives advice or makes a recommendation is committed "to act in ways that are consistent with the truth of" the propositional content p. Imagine that Agnes advises Bernard to buy an e-bike. She consequently commits herself to acting on [[Bernard will buy an e-bike]]. But she only gave advice! When we give advice, we may be more or less confident that our advice will be followed. Sometimes, we are quite confident, and it is sensible then to act on [[Bernard will buy an e-bike]]. At other times, however, we are much less confident. What sense is there, then, in acting on [[Bernard will buy an e-bike]]? There is something to be clarified here. Maybe Geurts's answer may consist in saying that there are different ways of acting on a proposition. That is certainly true. But two points need to be made in this respect. First, if act on is polysemous (or semantically underdetermined), it is not at all clear that that speaks in favour of Geurts's theory, given the important role that the phrase plays in definitions. Second, whatever finer interpretation is provided for act on, that will always involve an appeal to the truth of p, and that is precisely where the problem originates.
There are many more points of detail that could be gone into in a commentary like this. But none of those queries and reservations, nor any of the above, should detract from the scientific merit of Geurts's stimulating proposal. 
